What if water became the next oil? What its stock market listing and the different uses of water reveal.
Partager
I will revisit two important concepts that I began to develop in the previous article.
The listing of water on the stock market at the end of 2020 and the different types of water we need for sustenance (for living beings) and for the management of distribution structures, which primarily need cooling, such as the increasing number of data centers.
On December 7, 2020, a symbolic milestone was reached on the American financial markets: for the first time in history, water joined gold, oil, and wheat as a commodity traded on the stock exchange.
On that day, no one bought a single liter of water, but billions of dollars worth of contracts based on its price began to be traded.
Five years later, this event deserves our attention, as it sheds light on a much broader risk: that of seeing a naturally abundant and cyclical resource treated, financially, as if it were as rare and exhaustible as oil.
What happened on December 7, 2020
On that day, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the world's largest futures exchange, officially launched water futures contracts, under the ticker NQH2O, backed by the "Nasdaq Veles California Water Index". 
This index does not represent a physical stock of water somewhere in a reservoir: it measures the weighted value of water rights transactions and leases carried out in five major Californian markets, including four groundwater basins already subject to judicial adjudication due to disputed usage.
A market estimated, at its launch, at 1.1 billion dollars.
Concretely, this system allows municipalities, agricultural operations, but also investment funds and "hedge funds" that have never cultivated a single hectare or managed a water network in their lives, to buy and sell contracts representing millions of cubic meters of water, without ever holding a single drop. As incredible as it may seem, some people have no qualms about adding water to a system that profits from capitalism to make money instead of using common sense, because some things should not be monetized, and water is one of them.
It is a pure financial instrument for hedging and speculating on price volatility, exactly like the futures markets for oil, gas, or cereals. Another business for vultures.
How oil speculation works and why it's a concern for water
To understand the risk, we must first understand how the oil market works, as this is the model explicitly copied for water. For oil, the factor played upon is that it must be extracted because it is "hidden" in the ground; for water, it is more complicated because we can all see it flowing and understand its cycles. However, we are led to believe that with "climate change," we might run out of water, which is inconsistent since water is everywhere. Once again, the fear of "scarcity" is played upon through ignorance of what water truly is.
In oil markets, the displayed price per barrel only very partially reflects the actual extraction cost. It includes a geopolitical risk premium, anticipated production from OPEC countries, bets from traders who have never seen an oil well, and capital movements that amplify both rises and falls far beyond what physical supply and demand would justify.
Economic studies have shown, after the 2008 price surge, that financial speculation, and not solely real supply and demand, significantly amplified the volatility of the barrel.
Three structural mechanisms make this system problematic, and they apply identically when the model is transposed to water:
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Misalignment of interests.
A futures market only has value, for those who sustain it—exchanges, brokers, hedge funds—if the price remains volatile and uncertain.
The rarer the resource is perceived to be, and the more unstable its price, the more volumes are traded, and with them, the commissions collected.
Certain financial actors therefore have a direct economic interest in maintaining, or even worsening, the perception of scarcity, an interest structurally opposed to that of a sustainable resolution of the problem.
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Disconnection between financial price and physical reality.
Once a price index exists, it becomes an object of speculation itself, detached from the ground.
The price of NQH2O can climb due to anticipation, panic movements, or financial arbitrage, without a single additional cubic meter of water having physically been missing in the Californian aquifers.
This is exactly what happened for oil during several price spikes disconnected from production fundamentals.
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Concentration of price-setting power.
In the oil market, a small number of cartelized producers, large investment banks, and sovereign funds disproportionately influence global prices.
Structurally, nothing prevents a comparable phenomenon from developing for water as its derivative markets multiply: a few large funds or infrastructure operators could, in time, impact the price of access to a vital resource for millions of people who have no fallback option.
The paradox of an infinite resource treated as a finite one
Oil is a resource supposedly exhaustible on a human scale: every barrel burned never returns because they chose the term "fossil energy" instead of explaining the true origin of this abundant liquid underground.
As we can see, they chose to create an effect of scarcity to control the price "at the pump" and create "crises" to speculate with this product found everywhere underground.
We can even create biofuels from algae. So there are indeed alternative solutions, as I pointed out with K fuel, but "the cartels" don't want to hear too much about them. It's easier to say that "in 20 years, we'll run out of gas" than to explain that it's found everywhere.
Water, on the other hand, follows a closed cycle—evaporation, precipitation, runoff—and its global quantity on Earth has not changed for billions of years.
Applying the same financial tools to water as to oil therefore means importing, to a cyclical and abundant resource, all the instability of a market designed to manage the progressive exhaustion of a resource that, unlike water, does not renew itself.
This is a structurally flawed copy-paste: local and temporary water stresses (a shrinking water table in California, a dry river in southern France one summer) are real, but they are fundamentally different in nature from the geological depletion of oil.
Treating them with the same financial instruments risks transforming a distribution problem, solvable by engineering, infrastructure, and public policy, into a global price problem, shaped by actors who have neither the obligation nor a direct interest in solving the local scarcity they help to monetize.
"AI consumed as much water as humanity": anatomy of a shocking figure
In late 2025, a study by Alex de Vries-Gao, founder of the Digiconomist platform, published in the scientific journal Patterns, put a figure into media orbit: artificial intelligence supposedly consumed between 312.5 and 764.6 billion liters of water in 2025. 
Repeated ad nauseam in early 2026, this figure quickly transformed, in many press headlines and viral publications, into a spectacular shortcut: "AI consumed as much water as humanity." Except that the original study does not say that. What it compares, precisely, is the water footprint of AI to the annual global consumption of bottled water — estimated at approximately 446 billion liters per year.
Presenting this comparison as "AI versus humanity" conflates a very specific market segment (water sold in plastic bottles) with the totality of water needs for 8 billion human beings — drinking, cooking, hygiene, agriculture, industry — which amounts to thousands of billions of liters per year, several orders of magnitude higher.
The semantic shift, from "equivalent to bottled water" to "equivalent to all humanity," alone illustrates the mechanism of fabricated scarcity: a real, already impressive figure, inflated by media rephrasing until it becomes a comparison that no longer has physical meaning.
Drinking water, cooling a server: two uses that are not comparable
There's a biological dimension to this confusion, and it's worth detailing because it explains why the comparison doesn't hold, even when setting aside questions of scale and statistical methodology.
Here's a simple visual example of the hydration cycle.
When a human drinks a glass of water, that water is never "consumed" in the sense that it disappears. It is absorbed by the intestine, enters the bloodstream, participates in the body's thermal regulation, nutrient transport, renal filtration, and then it exits — through perspiration (evaporated from the skin's surface, exactly like lake water evaporates under the sun), through respiration (exhaled air contains water vapor), through urine (filtered by the kidneys, it goes into the sewers and then, after treatment, into a river or groundwater), and to a lesser extent through feces. This water completes, in a few hours, a full mini-cycle within the human body before returning to the greater water cycle — exactly the same principle as described in the introduction to this article, on the scale of an organism rather than a planet.
The water that cools a data center server follows a radically different path.
It fulfills only one precise physical function: absorbing the heat generated by processors, through simple thermal transfer, without any biological transformation. Depending on the systems, it then either evaporates directly into cooling towers (it then enters the atmosphere, like human sweat, but without any living organism having derived any physiological benefit from it in the process), or is discharged warmer into a watercourse or network, sometimes laden with chemical residues or biocides used to prevent circuit fouling — which can temporarily make it less reusable, unlike water biologically filtered by a human body.
Comparing the two therefore amounts to equating a vital, multifunctional, and biologically integrated use, without which an organism dies in a few days, with an industrial, mono-functional, purely thermal use for which alternatives exist (air cooling, closed circuits, dielectric fluids) that simply do not exist for human hydration.
Reducing both to the same figure in liters, as if they were interchangeable, erases everything that differentiates drinking from cooling.
This difference goes even further than the simple path of water in the organism: it concerns its composition. The water a human drinks is never a simple isolated H₂O molecule; it is "living" water, carrying mineral salts and trace elements (calcium, magnesium, potassium, sodium, bicarbonates, sometimes silica or zinc depending on the source) that the body actively uses to maintain its major balances: muscle contraction, nerve transmission, bone strength, acid-base balance of the blood. It is precisely this biological compatibility that makes "potable" water capable of nourishing an organism, not just hydrating it in volume. Completely pure water, stripped of all minerals (distilled water, for example), is not recommended for regular consumption: it contributes nothing to the body's mineral balance and can even, conversely, absorb some during its passage through the intestine.
The water that cools a data center, however, needs none of these qualities. Its only desired property is its ability to absorb and dissipate heat.
A simple physical property linked to its heat capacity, independent of any mineral composition. It doesn't even need to be potable: some operators already use non-potable, recycled, or industrially sourced water, precisely because potability adds absolutely nothing to the cooling function. Here, once again, we measure the gap between the two uses: one requires biocompatible water, capable of nourishing a living organism; the other is content with chemically neutral water, capable of exchanging heat. Reducing both to the same volume in liters ignores that it's not the same water being compared, but two definitions of water quality that are functionally unrelated.
Another sector, the same mechanism: the case of Bitcoin
This pattern is not unique to AI; it played out almost identically a few years earlier with Bitcoin, which confirms that it is a recurring communication bias rather than a problem specific to one sector. In late 2023, a study by economist Alex de Vries (him again, for Bitcoin this time) published in Cell Reports Sustainability calculated that a single Bitcoin transaction consumed approximately 16,000 liters of water. The shocking comparison, reported by almost all media, was "the equivalent of a swimming pool." On a global scale, mining allegedly mobilized over 1,600 billion liters of water during the 2020-2021 period, a volume compared, depending on the publications, to the consumption of several hundred thousand American households, or even that of 300 million people living in rural areas worldwide.
However, a specialist in the water consumption of digital technologies, Shaolei Ren, quickly pointed out a methodological flaw in these calculations: the study confused household water consumption with mere water withdrawal, two very different concepts since most of the water withdrawn for domestic use returns, after treatment, to the natural cycle, whereas net consumption (water actually removed, mainly by evaporation) is much lower. This technical confusion, once corrected, significantly changed the order of magnitude of the comparison—without preventing the spectacular figure from continuing to circulate as is in the press and social networks, the methodological nuance being much less interesting than a swimming pool per transaction.
The common thread between AI and Bitcoin is therefore not a problem of digital ecology—their electricity and water consumption remains a real and documented issue—but a problem of the rhetoric of scarcity, consistent with everything this article has established so far: since water is a cyclical resource whose global quantity does not vary, presenting it as literally "consumed" and in direct competition with humanity's vital needs serves to dramatize a real problem (the localization of certain uses in already strained areas, the quality of discharged water) by distorting it into a problem it is not: a net and irreversible subtraction from a global stock that, by design, never runs out.
A scenario to watch, not yet an inevitability
We must be precise: five years after its launch, the NQH2O market remains a niche market, confined to California, and no other comparable index has yet emerged globally on a significant scale. To date, there is no water futures market in France or Europe. However, the logic that allowed its creation—presenting the increasing scarcity of water as a risk to be "managed" via financial tools rather than a problem to be solved through infrastructure and distribution—is found, in a milder form, in the discourse accompanying today's announcements about water governance in France: centralization of management, multiplication of stress indicators, and the omnipresent narrative of scarcity in public communication. 
This is not proof of a hidden plan for a French financial water market, but it is the same vocabulary, the same grammar of scarcity, that preceded the birth of the Californian market. And when we know that certain politicians like Gabriel Attal are "young global leaders," we can easily understand that a precise pricing and distribution of water is being prepared, just like for oil. So let's be very attentive because water is a primary need; it cannot be an object of speculation. Unfortunately, we know that these people have neither ethics nor morals.
The other possible interpretation
It would be incomplete to present only this critical interpretation. Proponents of this type of instrument put forward arguments that deserve to be heard:
- A hedging tool, not pure speculation. NQH2O proponents emphasize that it is primarily a tool for farmers and municipalities to hedge against unpredictable price increases, rather than enduring volatility without a safety net. An excuse to implement, due to events like "climate change," other measures already in place; we know the song and dance.
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Better information on local scarcity. A transparent price index can, in theory, reveal resource tensions more quickly and encourage faster usage savings than purely administrative and opaque management.
With the arrival of "smart cities" and other connected cities, we will soon hear about consumption regulation, further proof that they are applying the exact same pattern as with oil. - The difference between hedging market and physical ownership. Unlike oil, these contracts do not grant the right to "own" water or block others' access to it—they concern price risk, not a monopolizable physical asset.
The debate therefore remains open. But the history of oil recalls a useful lesson: a market designed to manage price risk often ends up, over time, becoming a price factor itself, and for a resource as vital as water, this shift deserves very close monitoring. Especially since we can feel "energy passports" coming, given the summer we are experiencing.
Naturasounds—to reconnect with the natural cycles around us and understand that water is an essential need, not a rare or monetizable commodity; its access must be for everyone. Like the healthcare system, we should have governments that facilitate its use through quality analysis and allow for qualitative distribution. Let's remain vigilant about political and economic orientations because they cannot "sell" us the idea that water has become scarce, given that we are mostly made of water and for an organism to function well, all its molecules must be hydrated.